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Presentation  Outline 
 Effects of Space Radiation on Exposed Spacecraft Materials 
 Space Radiation Dose to Exposed Spacecraft materials:  Dose vs. 
Depth on the Exterior of the Spacecraft  
 Some General Considerations: Plastics and Polymers in the Space 
Radiation Environment  
 Plastics, Polymers, Adhesives (and Hydrazine) 
 Carbon fiber composites 
 Ceramics and glasses 
 Lubricants 
 Effects of Space Radiation on Spacecraft Electronic Systems 
Total Ionizing Dose  
Displacement Dose Damage 
Single Event Effects 
Photovoltaic Systems 
Guidance Navigation, Control, Data Handling 
  What do I do about all this? 
 And what happens if I don’t? 
 References 
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Effects on Exposed Spacecraft Materials 
Hubble during Servicing Mission 3B in 2002 
with New Outer Blanket Layers. New Outer 
Blanket Layer covers were installed on Bays 5 
(not pictured), 7 and 8 during Servicing 
Mission 4. Credit: NASA 
Photograph of Hubble Space telescope taken during the 
second servicing mission, showing the very large, vertical 
light shield cracked area and the tightly curled upper light 
shield cracked area. Credit: NASA 
ISS – No external 
Teflon materials 
failures in 12 years 
(including the mobile 
transporter cable) 
Credit: NASA 
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Space Radiation Dose to Exposed Spacecraft Materials:  
Dose vs. Depth on the Exterior of the Spacecraft  
The poly tetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) 
Teflon soft X-ray mass adsorption 
coefficient is typical of many organic 
materials and changes by several 
orders of magnitude as photon 
energy increases from 10-3  to 10-1  
MeV. 
 
Given the range of soft X-ray 
energies in each of the two bands 
(red and blue vertical lines) reported 
by the geosynchronous orbiting 
environmental satellite (GOES), and 
the rapidly changing mass 
absorption coefficient over the 
energy range of interest, estimation 
of surface dose is accompanied by 
considerable uncertainty.   
   
http://www.nist.gov/pml/data/xraycoef/index.cfm 
Energetic photons and the low-energy end of the charged particle 
populations drive the near surface dose rate and materials degradation 
Van Allen Belts – Annual Dose vs. Altitude/Orbit  - Al Shielding 
Mass  - Trapped Radiation (electrons and protons) 
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Credit: ESA/Spenvis 
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ISS Design Environment  -  electron and proton dose to the center of an 
aluminum sphere of radius = shielding thickness in mils (1 mil = 0.025 mm) 
5 mm 
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FLUKA: Solar Particle Events – Dose, Depth, Shielding Material 
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Steve Koontz, William Atwell, Brandon Reddell, Kristina Rojdev; NASA TP-2010-216133   
3.4 FLUKA:  Effects of spacecraft shielding mass elemental composition/ atomic 
number (Al vs. PE) on the spacecraft SEE environment (GEO/Interplanetary) 
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(DoseTotAlSi) and PE (DoseTotPESi)  shielding.   
TID (y axis) vs. median shielding mass (x axis)  
Steve Koontz, Brandon Reddell, Paul Boeder: “Calculating Spacecraft single Event Environments with FLUKA, Paper W-33, 
Proceedings of the 2011 NSREC Radiation  Effects Data Workshop, IEEE, July 2011 
3.5 FLUKA:  Effects of spacecraft shielding mass elemental composition/ atomic 
number (Al vs. PE) on the spacecraft SEE environment (GEO/Interplanetary) 
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Some General Considerations: Plastics and Polymers in the 
Space Radiation Environment 
 Pure generic engineering polymers do not exist – performance 
properties  (including ionizing radiation degradation) depend on 
the “additive cocktail” and the details of polymer formulation  
 There are hundreds if not thousands of formulations for each generic polymer 
type; all optimized for particular applications 
 Generic  historical ionizing radiation test data are not usually applicable to your 
polymer formulation for your spacecraft 
 The presence of air and oxygen  is very important in determining 
the response of a polymer to ionizing radiation  
 Total Ionizing Dose (TID) leading to property loss can be an order of magnitude 
lower in the presence of oxygen, at oxygen partial pressures of even a fraction of 
an atmosphere 
 Possible issue in lightly shielded habitable volumes in long mission duration 
spacecraft 
 Co60  gamma rays (with our without oxygen)are often used in 
spacecraft materials testing because: 
 cost and availability are attractive, 
 there is, at present, little compelling evidence driving us to higher fidelity with the 
flight environment, and 
 There are no surface or deep dielectric charging artifacts as would be expected 
from any charged particle beam ionizing radiation testing  
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Plastics, Polymers, and Adhesives 
(and Hydrazine) 
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Material Bulk (excluding surface 
damage) limiting Dose in cGy 
(Co60 gamma rays in air) 
Comments 
Multi Layer Insulation Blankets 
(except Teflon) 
> 108 Verified data (JPL) 
Polymeric  Materials   107  to 109  Typical range for contemporary 
polymer formulations 
Adhesives 108 Typical, usually shielded 
Composites, Epoxy 108 Onset-of-change dose 
Composites, Cyanate 109 Onset-of-change dose 
Cabling (Raychem Spec 44/55)* 5 x 108 Verified data (JPL) 
Seals and Elastomers 5 x 107 Usually shielded environment 
Lubricants (polymeric) 106 to 109 Usually shielded environment 
Hydrazine (N2H4) 10
6 1% decomposition noted 
http://opfm.jpl.nasa.gov/files/9.2_Willis.pdf   
 
* http://www.gore.com/en_xx/products/cables/microwave/radiation_resistance.html  
Carbon Fiber Composites 
Material Bulk limiting Dose in cGy 
(Co60 gamma rays in air) 
Comments 
Composites, Epoxy 108 Onset of change dose 
Composites, Cyanate 109 Onset of change dose 
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http://opfm.jpl.nasa.gov/files/9.2_Willis.pdf 
 Carbon fibers have high radiation resistance and mitigate damage to the 
organic binder phase – Binder phases with more aromatic (i.e. toluene ring 
like structures in polymer molecules) character  have better TID performance 
 
 Conventional epoxy composites generally good to 108 cGy   
 
 New cyanate matrix composites (175o C cure) good to 109 cGy (highly aromatic 
binder chemistry)  
 
 Newer 120o C cure cyanates (anti-rad chemical structures) good to >1010 cGy  
 
 Carbon-carbon composites – no organics so no problem good to  >1010 cGy  
 
 Testing of organic composites is critical areas should be required 
Glasses, Ceramics, and Metals 
Material Bulk limiting Dose in cGy 
(Co60 gamma rays in air) 
Comments 
Glasses  105  To 1010   Depends on composition and 
formulation 
Ceramics 1012 Typical Value 
Lubricants (inorganic, no 
polymeric binders) 
>1010 Usually shielded environment 
Metals >1018 Typical Value 
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 Radiation resistant glasses formulated with cerium oxide for stability 
 Schott BK-G18, K5G20, LF5G15, SK4G13, SF6G05, etc 
 Suprasil III fused silica used in Voyager narrow angle camera 
 No change after 1016   cGy 0.8 MeV electrons and 108 cGy 2 MeV protons   
 Corning 7940  
 Only minor changes at 1014 cGy electrons (800 keV), 104 cGy 2 MeV protons, and 1030  
neutrons/cm2    
 Optical Coatings 
 Surface exposure implies high proton and electron dose and sputtering and surface 
charging/dielectric breakdown  risks 
 Tantalum oxide and silicon oxide proven in multi-gigarad service on solar cell cover 
glass in GEO 
http://opfm.jpl.nasa.gov/files/9.2_Willis.pdf 
Photovoltaic and Optoelectronic Systems: 
TID and DDD 
 Three primary targets for space 
radiation degradation 
 1) TID Solar cell cover glass darkening 
 2) TID Solar cell cover glass adhesive 
 3) Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) to 
the photovoltaic cell itself 
 Items 1 and 2 are largely solved 
 Dow Corning, NuSil and Wacker produce 
suitable DC 93-500 Silicone Adhesives or 
equivalents that do not darken 
significantly at 10 8  cGy  
  TID resistant glass solar cell cover glass 
available from JDSU (ISS) and QIOPTIQ 
among others 
 DDD resistant space qualified solar 
cells and complete satellite solar 
power systems available from:  
 Emcore  
 Azure Space  
 Boeing 
 ATK 
 and others 
 Note that many spacecraft have 
operated for 15 or more years in 
geosynchronous orbit without 
significant power degradation 
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Spacecraft  Avionics Systems 
Credit: NASA Credit: NASA 
Credit: NASA 
Solid state electronic devices as 
charged particle detectors: 
Single Event Effects (SEE) 
Schematics of a solid state charged 
particle detector (right) and a  
MOSFET transistor (left) illustrating 
the particle counting or single event 
upset process.  Direct ionization by CR 
charged particles and charged particles 
produced by nuclear reactions in the 
device can produce counts in the 
detector and SEE events in the 
transistor only if the devices are 
powered, i.e. only if an electric field is 
applied to force charge collection.  
 
Solid state electronic devices as 
charged particle detectors: 
Total Ionizing Dose (TID) 
Effects 
Schematic of n-channel MOSFET 
illustrating radiation-induced charging 
of the gate oxide: (a) normal operation 
and (b) post-irradiation.  The 
electrostatic field produced by trapped 
charge in SiOx layers changes device 
characteristics.  TID damge 
accumulated even if the device is 
unpowered. 
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Cosmic Ray Effects on Contemporary Electronic Technology 
T. R. Oldham, F. B. McLean; “Total Ionizing Dose Effects in MOS Oxides and 
Devices,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 483-499, June 2003 
 
http://nsspi.tamu.edu/nsep/courses/bas
ic-radiation-detection/semiconductor-
detectors  
Lauriente, M., Vampola, Al. L.,  "Spacecraft 
anomalies due to radiation environment in 
space,"  NASDA/JAERI 2nd International 
Workshop on Radiation Effects of Semiconductor 
Devices for Space Applications, Tokyo, Japan, 
March 1996.  
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Estimating SEE rates: Verifying Spacecraft System Safety and Reliability  
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Electronic device heavy ion accelerator test data  -  
Measured device cross section (σ(LET,Ɵ, Φ)) vs. 
Heavy ion effective LET value expressed as an 
integral Weibull or the log normal distribution 
function, or  the tabulated test results data 
Steve Koontz, Brandon Reddell, Paul Boeder: “Calculating Spacecraft single Event Environments with FLUKA, Paper W-33, Proceedings of the 2011 
NSREC Radiation  Effects Data Workshop, IEEE, July 2011 
Nuclear reactions internal to the microelectronic device can be triggered by primary and secondary 
particle (especially those producing little or no direct ionization e.g. neutrons, protons, and pions)  
inelastic collisions with microelectronic device nuclei to produce high-LET, short-range fragments. 
   
SEU Rate = σ(device-particle) x Flux (particles/time)   
Single Event Effects caused by 
 direct ionization  
Single Event Effects caused by in-device nuclear reactions - nuclear reaction 
recoil fragmentation and spallation products  cause direct ionization SEE 
In-flight vs. calculated spacecraft device SEU rates  
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Shielding Mass Rate Ratio =(10 g/cm2  Rate)/ (40 g/cm2  Rate) 
Note that only FLUKA correctly quantifies the 
shielding mass (i.e. secondary particle shower) effects 
for the ISS TI CMOS DRAM.  
Using the same device parameter, the FLUKA based rate calculations show the smallest least 
squares error and overall acceptable performance compared to CREME-96 and the Peterson 
FOM, providing some validation for the FLUKA based methods described here.  
Device Rate 
Ratio -
Flight 
 
Rate 
Ratio -
FLUKA 
Rate Ratio - 
CREME 96 
 
Rate 
Ratio  -
FOM 
 
TI (1M x 4) 
TMS44400 
1.2 1.2 3.5 3.7 
TI (4M x 4)  
TI SMJ41640 
0.9 1.8 3.4 5.3 
Steve Koontz, Brandon Reddell, Paul Boeder: “Calculating Spacecraft single Event Environments with FLUKA, Paper W-33, 
Proceedings of the 2011 NSREC Radiation  Effects Data Workshop, IEEE, July 2011 
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Avionics Systems Safety and Reliability 
 What is the probability of component or box failure? 
 TID and DDD damage buildup over time like a wear-out process leading to 
failure in a comparatively narrow time interval – Mean Time to Failure 
 SEE is a random (Poisson) process characterized by an average rate and a 
standard deviation – Mean Time Between Failure 
 What is the probability of system failure leading to a hazardous 
condition or loss of mission success? 
 TID and DDD processes can lead to common cause failures of multiple 
components  -   so we need margin to make sure this doesn’t happen during the 
mission – redundancy doesn’t really help 
 SEE processes display an environment dependent rate over the life of the mission 
- the same for day 1 and day 1000 if corrected for environmental variation and 
not changed by TID/DDD effects – no common cause - Poisson Process - 
redundancy helps in a big way 
 Example – consider a three box redundant system 
 From SEE testing of components and summing the component SEE functional interrupt 
rates in one box leads to a 10 -2 /day box level failure probability 
 If all three boxes must fail to fail the system then the daily system failure probability is    
(10 -2 )3 /day= 10-6 /day 
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Avionics Systems Safety and Reliability 
 Cost –Benefit Trade Space:   
Low initial cost commercial off the shelf  (COTS) components 
and systems 
High verification and parts control/auditing cost if used in high 
reliability (HiRel) systems 
High initial cost up-screened or space rated components 
Low verification and parts control/auditing cost if used in Hi Rel 
systems 
 Some commercial sources of HiRel space rated avionics 
components and systems  
http://www.aeroflex.com/      
http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsServices/bae_prod_eis_rad_hr
d_electrnic.html   
http://www.maxwell.com/products/microelectronics/about.aspx?sid
=MICROELECTRONICS-TECHNOLOGY   
  http://www.spacemicro.com/   
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SO WHAT DO I DO ABOUT ALL THIS? 
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What you need to produce a safe and verified design 
 Well defined design reference mission (DRM) with SEE/TID/DDD environments 
 Mission duration in each SEE/TID/DDD environments 
 SEE/TID/DDD environments definitions for design and verification  
 Mission concept of operations (ConOps) 
 Space radiation transport/shielding models to allow reasonably accurate 
TID/SEE/DDD  environment calculations (estimates) anywhere in the spacecraft 
during any phase of the mission 
 Quantitative spacecraft, subsystem, and component level safety, reliability, and 
mission success requirements 
 Part, component and box level requirements must be consistent with overall  vehicle 
performance and operations requirements 
 Determines, along with budget marks, parts, component , materials selection and 
test/verification approach as well as materials/parts control and auditing requirements 
 Determines system redundancy requirements 
 The trade space 
 Space Qualified materials/parts/systems 
 little or no verification testing and straightforward parts control   
 COTS materials/Parts  
 substantial verification testing and difficult parts control 
 Note that  there is no TID/SEE/DDD acceptance test at this time – That means you must be 
able to define a qualification test unit or the testing is meaningless => parts control and 
auditing 
 Are operational hazard controls possible  to compensate for  the reliability limitations of the 
final  design? 
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AND WHAT 
HAPPENS IF I DO 
NOTHING? 
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NOZOMI 
On April 21, 2002 as Nozomi was approaching Earth for 
the gravity assist maneuver –  
 
Powerful “solar flares” (SPEs) damaged the spacecraft's 
onboard communications and power systems, but the 
spacecraft was recovered. 
 
As the spacecraft approached Mars in 2003 series of 
intense solar flares damaged a power control circuit 
(current switch).   
 
The subject current switch controlled power to both a 
telemetry modulator and THE HEATERS FOR THE MAIN 
PROPULSION FUEL TANKS.   
 
What seemed to be an efficient design feature  - one 
switch handles two functions -  really exposed the 
spacecraft to a single point failure 
 
Switch failure was unrecoverable after 1000 power cycles 
 
Propellant for the main engines freezes solid  
 
December 9, 2003 JAXA engineers abandon Mars orbital 
insertion – adjust orbit to avoid collision with Mars using 
still operable attitude control jets 
 
Dec. 14, 2003 – Nozomi sails past Mars and into oblivion 
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ESA’s  SMART-1 achieved several firsts. 
 
1) First electric propulsion mission to Moon from Earth 
 
2) Successful demonstration of a mix of commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) and RAD/SEE hard avionics components in the 
extreme  space radiation environment caused by many 
passes through the Earths radiation belts on the way out 
from the starting geosynchronous transfer orbit (low thrust 
hall effect ion engines) 
 
3) Demonstrated protection of COTS components from 
destructive latch-up with circuitry that detects increased 
current draw from latch-up events and cycles power to clear 
 
4) Demonstration of  effectiveness of systems redundancy 
to support use of COTS hardware 
 
5) Very low cost program ( $170M with essential 90 % plus 
mission success)  
 
HOWEVER 
 
1) There were numerous radiation induced anomalies 
including several electric propulsion system shutdowns 
and described in O. Camino et al. / Acta Astronautica 61 
(2007) 203 – 222. 
2) The SMART-1 mission profile was very forgiving of 
recoverable failures - Just re-point the ion engine and 
work an new trajectory -   
3) Additional work (in progress at ESA) will be needed to 
make the SMART-1 approach acceptable for safety 
critical application in manned spacecraft.  
And what happens if I try  
an unusual approach? 
http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n0410/18smart1/ 
SUPPORTING MATERIALS 
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Natural Environment Definitions: CREME 96, Peterson Figure of Merit, and 
FLUKA Natural Environment Parameters 
26 
• CREME 96 and FOM input natural environments  for calculations (16) 
– GEO/Interplanetary Fluxes, Solar Minimum, Z=1-92 
– ISS: 362km/51.6 , Solar Minimum, 
– GCR environment based on "A Model of Galactic Cosmic Ray Fluxes", by R.A. Nymmik, M.I. Panasyuk, T.I Pervaja, and A.A. Suslov, Nuclear Tracks and Radiation 
Measurements, 20, 427-429 (1992)  
• FLUKA input natural environments  for calculations 
– Uses a subset of the CREME-96 Environments as shown below  
• H, He, C, O, Mg, Si, Fe, Zn  
• Accounts for 90 % + of total GCR flux 
• Increases computational speed and efficiency with negligible impact on accuracy  
FLUKA Methods Overview 
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• FLUKA Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport code (1) 
– Theory driven and benchmarked with data - Based on original and verified  microscopic interactions 
models  
• FLUKA is not a tool kit, rather a transport code with fully integrated physics models 
• First principle model – no adjustable parameters – does not rely on extrapolated empirical look-up tables 
– Nucleus-nucleus interactions from 100 MeV/n to 10000 TeV/n 
– Hadron-hadron and hadron-nucleus interactions 0–10000 TeV 
– Exact dE/dx ionization (LET) calculation with delta ray production and statistical fluctuations 
– No limitation on projectile/target composition or combination 
• Simple 3D spacecraft model 
– Concentric spherical shells – simple shielding mass distribution function for each shell  
• 10 μ thick Si “detector” shells at various shielding mass depths – optional 1 μ metallization layers on outward 
facing Si shell surface (a generic microelectronic device structure) 
• Report TID and nuclear reaction rates for each Si or metallization shell 
• Report LET spectra entering outward facing surface of Si detector shell 
• SEE rate calculations 
– Calculate SEE rates with: 
• Differential LET spectrum entering each Si detector shell at each shielding depth in the concentric sphere 
structure (Includes all secondary particle production in “spacecraft shielding mass and metallization layers) 
• Directional cross section function, σ(LET,Ɵ,Φ), from device heavy ion test data 
– Same σ(LET,Ɵ,Φ) in CREME-96 and Petersen Figure of Merit (FOM) calculations 
FLUKA 2008.3b Calculation Details – Detector Shell Configuration 
28 
 
• Spacecraft shielding simulated using FLUKA 3D concentric spherical 
shells 
 
• 10 micron Si detector shells are inserted at different shielding depths with 
optional 11 micron heavy element shells (over-layers) on the silicon shells 
 
• Each concentric shell is a FLUKA “region” with specific boundary 
surfaces. 
 
• The volume of the sphere at radii smaller than 5000 cm is treated as a 
perfect particle absorber in all FLUKA calculations reported here.  FLUKA 
reports the number of particles of LET X entering the 10μ Si detector shells 
per primary particle, as well as the number of nuclear reactions and total 
energy deposition (TID), also per primary particle, internal to each of the 
concentric spherical shell shielding shells,  10μ Si shells, or 1μ metal shells 
on the Si shells.  
FLUKA 2008.3b Calculation Details – Detector Shell Shielding Mass 
29 
 
• FLUKA  launches  randomly directed energetic particles into the 3D 
concentric spherical model spacecraft  structure, thereby sampling the full 
shielding mass distribution function of the model 
• Simulates an isotropic particle flux on a concentric spherical shell 
structure.  
• The shielding mass distribution function metrics (Table 1 below) 
corresponding to each of  the 10µ Si detector shells (or 1µ over layer 
shells) are used  for  data reporting and comparison. 
• Example – shielding mass distribution function metrics values in g/cm2  Al 
for each Si shell in the concentric spherical spacecraft model.  Metrics for 
another shielding material, X,  can be obtained by multiplying the density 
ratio, ρx/ρAl  
FLUKA Target SiDet1 SiDet2 SiDet3 SiDet4 SiDet5 SiDet6 SiDet7 SiDet8 
Spherical shell minimum shielding mass thickness 
(along the radius) in g/cm2 
0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 100 
Spherical shell median shielding thickness, with 
geometric cosine  correction only, in g/cm2 
0.14 0.70 1.40 6.90 13.7 27.3 68.1 137.2 
Spherical shell median shielding thickness, with cosine 
and solid angle corrections, in  g/cm2 
0.15 0.81 1.6 7.9 15.6 31.1 77.5 156.2 
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• FLUKA simulations produce the differential form of the LET spectra entering each 10μ Si shell 
– Forward going particles only reported here – backward going particle fluxes are also calculated, but do not contribute significantly to 
the result 
– FLUKA “USRYIELD” utility used to recover LET spectra of particles crossing boundaries 
– Results reported on a per geometric region or region boundary and per primary particle basis 
– Scaling to on-orbit primary particle flux/fluence  
 
• Use the integral form of the microelectronic device directional cross section σ(LET,Ɵ,Φ) and the following σ(LET,Ɵ,Φ) 
approximations as determined by the test/flight data sources 
 
 
The x y plane is the plane of the 
microelectronic device die 
 
– Ɵ and Φ define the entry angle of a particle in the microelectronic device coordinate system 
– σ(LET,Ɵ,Φ) represented as a simple geometric solid with a specific aspect ratio (width/thickness) 
• Isotropic Target,  (17) σ(L,θ) = σN(L) for all θ sometimes observed especially for CMOS DRAM 
• Cosine Law Target,  (17), σ(L,θ) = |cosθ| σN( L / |cosθ| ) up to θ = 60 degrees, commonly observed, (17)  
• Right Circular Cylinder (RCC) Target , (18-21). Note that we use the average (first moment) cord length for a given θ, not the 
full chord length distribution  
 
• The on-orbit rate estimate is then given by: Upset Rate = ∫∫∫ f[LET] x σ(LET,Ɵ, Φ) d(LET)d(Ɵ) d(Φ) 
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• Estimating Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and nuclear reaction (star) rates per unit volume 
– FLUKA “SCORE” utility reports total ionizing dose and nuclear reactions (“stars”) caused by all: 
• Protons 
• Neutrons 
• Pions   
– SCORE also reports expected in-flight total ionizing dose and “star” density using concentric spherical 
shell model dimensions and with scaling to on-orbit primary particle flux/fluence values 
• How do we know all this works (method validation/success metric)? 
– Calculate least squares error metric –  Σ(in-flight rate  - estimated rate)2 as a generic quality assessment 
of the various SEE rate estimate methods 
– If in flight rate predictions are within “a factor of a few” of the pre-flight predictions the method is 
usually considered more than adequate for practical work (17)  
– As a minimum, the on-orbit SEE rate calculation method should provide SEE rate estimates accurate to 
within a factor of 10 at one standard deviation when compared to available in-flight data (22-24) 
• Run-to-run variability and error bars in Monte Carlo calculations 
– Monte Carlo models simulate real physical experiments or measurements including natural (random) 
quantum and statistical fluctuations, so the results of two statistically independent runs are not expected 
to be equal.  
– As is the case for radioisotope decay, and other Poisson processes, the uncertainty in a Monte Carlo 
particle or event count is equal to the square root of the number of particles or events in the result 
– In the following, plot symbols are always selected to be larger than or equal to the expected error of the 
numbers plotted unless two statistically independent FLUKA runs are plotted, in which case the error 
plot represents the spread in the data points directly   
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